Cambodia in 1995: From Hope to Despair

Abstract

The events of the past year in Cambodia should be viewed against the background of the dynamics set in motion by the nationwide elections of May 1993. These elections essentially represented an attempt by the international community to force the different Cambodian factions to come to terms with one another through the imposition of a new social contract. Much of the stalemate that had prevented the conclusion of a peace accord in the previous years had to do with determining who in Cambodia represented the legitimate power, and it was hoped that the installation of a democratic political process would finally resolve that issue. Elections held in what was termed a neutral political environment and recognized by the international community would bring to power a government whose legitimacy would have to be acknowledged by all the Cambodian factions. But the idea of rooting political power in Cambodia in the concept of popular representation rather than in the complex of factional allegiances that have traditionally dominated the nation's political landscape was seen by the factional elites as inherently threatening to their authority. The story of the May 1993 elections, therefore, was that of the resistance of these groups to the democratization of Cambodia, coupled with their attempt to strengthen their positions within Cambodian society. In the wake of these efforts, a post-elections agreement allowed the creation of a two-headed government led by Prince Ranariddh of the royalist FUNCINPEC (Front Uni National pour un Cambodge Independant, Neutre, Pacifique et Cooperati/) and Hun Sen of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP), as well as the adoption of a constitution that reinstalled Norodom Sihanouk as king. The agreement was meant to maintain in place the two traditional centers of gravity in