Abstract
AbstractThis paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several ‘calibration dilemmas’, in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities. We first lay out a series of such dilemmas for prioritarian theories. We then consider a widely endorsed family of egalitarian views and show that they are subject to even more forceful calibration dilemmas than prioritarian theories. Finally, we show that our results challenge common utilitarian accounts of the badness of inequalities in resources.
Highlights
Leading contemporary theories in the ethics of distribution can be regarded as attempts to stake out a reasonable middle ground between two extremes.On one extreme is the utilitarian principle of distribution, which evaluates distributions according to their total well-being
We take our calibration dilemmas for prioritarianism and egalitarianism to weaken the appeal that these views have over the extreme opposites of utilitarianism on the one hand and leximin on the other hand
A utilitarian like the one under consideration could only be moderately averse to inequality with respect to resources when little is at stake and few people are involved if she is extremely averse to inequality when more is at stake and more people are involved
Summary
Leading contemporary theories in the ethics of distribution can be regarded as attempts to stake out a reasonable middle ground between two extremes. Most contemporary theorists in the ethics of distribution agree that leximin is implausibly extreme They have said surprisingly little about how much priority we should give, instead of absolute priority, to the worse off.. It is hard to see how else an egalitarian could make decisions that involve tradeoffs between equality and total well-being, without using her judgement This does not mean, that prioritarians and egalitarians can consistently endorse any combination of distributive judgements about all cases. In our calibration dilemmas, seemingly reasonable aversion to inequalities involving small differences in well-being commits prioritarianism and the most commonly defended version of egalitarianism to seemingly unreasonable aversion to inequalities involving larger differences in well-being – e.g. inequalities from which half the population would gain an arbitrarily large quantity of well-being. In the concluding section we consider these responses and suggest avenues for further research
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