Cadre Personnel Management and the Central–Local Relations of China’s Financial Governance: The Rise of ‘Airlifted’ Vice-Provincial Governors in Financial Affairs

Abstract

ABSTRACT Since the 18th National Party Congress, many high-ranking business executives and regulators from China’s financial system have been appointed as the so-called ‘airlifted’ vice-provincial governors in financial affairs. This article presents a systematic biographic profile of this group of rising technocrats. It argues that in appointing these central financial elites to provinces, the Party centre has used the cadre personnel management system to promote governance capability building through technocratic professionalization of local administrative leadership, and drive the recentralization of financial governance as Chinese political economy overall shifts towards prioritizing risk management, systemic stability and national security. It also constitutes a venue for cadre grooming. Moreover, this personnel control via airlifting technocratic appointments has often been prompted, and also constrained, by a short-term crisis management imperative to deal with local financial turbulence and restore market stability.