Cablegate and the continuing US penetration in Brazil

Daniel Zirker

doi:10.33956/tensoesmundiais.v11i21.411

Abstract

Jan Black outlined the US penetration of Brazilian politics in the 1960s and 1970s, including the linkages with military and business elites, revealing their compromise on national sovereignty. Based on cables released by WikiLeaks, this study shows a renewed emphasis by the US government to manipulate Brazilian domestic and foreign policies in the late 1990s and 2000s.

Highlights

1 INTRODUCTION By 2015, it is clear that the United States is no longer in a position to “change the regime or those who govern” in Brazil, as Jan Knippers Black described one key element of US penetration of Brazil in her 1977 book
Academic works over the last two decades (e.g., HIRST, 2005) have themselves seemed to misunderstand the complexity of US-Brazilian relations in the age of BRICS, the “Pink Tide,” and political crises, tending to minimize the importance of Brazil to US policy makers, while paradoxically pointing to Brazil as a “regional giant,” and arguing that “the deterioration in the quality of US relations with the region as a whole...increases the importance of maintaining an open channel of understanding with Brazil” (SOARES DE LIMA and HIRST, 2006: 35)
In the age of Chinese influence and BRICS, Brazil’s significant influence in a range of foreign policy areas, both regional and global, is undeniable, even if US policy makers are often confused by the complexity of US-Brazilian relations

Summary

INTRODUCTION

By 2015, it is clear that the United States is no longer in a position to “change the regime or those who govern” in Brazil, as Jan Knippers Black described one key element of US penetration of Brazil in her 1977 book. He said that no dates had been confirmed for visits by Ahmadinejad or Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, but said that the Ahmadinejad visit will happen in late November, which would push back the Abbas visit into December at earliest....Pires spoke briefly about Brazil’s decision to back Egyptian candidate Farouk Hosni over Irina Bokova for the UNESCO Director General....Several local publications have criticized the GOB position on this matter, calling it a “diplomatic defeat” dictated by Lula’s desire to strengthen relations with Iran and the Middle East These same reports, apparently based on leaked sources from Itamaraty, questioned why Brazil did not make the case to promote one of its own, UNESCO Deputy Director-General Marcio Barbosa. Lula’s apparently close relationship with Iran’s President Ahmadinejad led to extensive, if oblique, criticism in the cable traffic, indicating strong US pressure on Lula and, eventually, a weakening of the relationship, as perhaps evidenced in Ahmadinejad’s failure to visit Brazil in 2012

China and Brazil China increasingly occupied the attention of the State

CONCLUSIONS