Business Resources and Taxation: A Cross-Sectional Examination of the Relationship Between Economic Organization and Public Policy

Abstract

Many writers have speculated about the connection between economic resources of corporations and their ability to dominate politics in democratic societies with advanced capitalist economies. Using a cross-sectional analysis of business taxes in the American states, this study examines the political impact of four economic resources that are plausibly related to heightened business political influence. With seven factors held constant, I find that states with larger enterprises are most likely to have lower taxes on manufacturing, but concentrated sales do not have any effect on these taxes. The degree to which the organizational efforts of firms are handicapped because industry products are diverse also has an independent relationship with state and local taxes paid by manufacturers, but this relationship does not hold when the least industrial states are excluded from the equations. I also find that where competition between political parties is most intense, tax policies will be less likely to favor business interests. It follows that the evidence in this study is consistent with a hypothesis that firms can translate their formidable economic resources into political influence at the state and local level.