Business Lobbying: Mapping Policy Networks in Brazil in Mercosur

Galia Benítez

doi:10.3390/socsci7100198

Abstract

In the creation of trade policy, business actors have the most influence in setting policy. This article identifies and explains variations in how economic interest groups use policy networks to affect trade policymaking. This article uses formal social network analysis (SNA) to explore the patterns of articulation or a policy network between the government and business at the national level within regional trade agreements. The empirical discussion herein focuses on Brazil and the setting of exceptions list to Mercosur’s common external tariff. It specifically concentrates on the relations between the Brazilian executive branch and ten economic subsectors. The article finds that the patterns of articulation of these policy networks matter and that sectors with stronger ties to key government decision-makers have a structural advantage in influencing trade policy and obtaining and/or maintaining their desired, privileged trade policies, compared with sectors that are connected to government actors with weak decision-making power, but might have numerous and diversified connections. Therefore, sectors that have a strong pluralist–clientelist policy structure with connections to government actors with decision-making power have greater potential for achieving their target policies compared with more corporatist policy networks.

Highlights

The literature on interest groups and lobbying has extensively studied “whose voice gets heard”and unanimously concludes that groups have unequal amounts of power and influence in the political process (Grossmann 2012; Woll 2008; Magee et al 1989)
For the Brazilian case within Mercosur, this paper found that sectors that form a strong pluralist–clientelist policy structure have greater potential for achieving their target policies compared with a strong corporatist policy network, despite that both are connected to government policy deciders
Trade policymaking has been described as a ‘policy market’ in which the interconnection of the demand for policy coming from interest groups and the supply of policy provided by the state is essential to explain trade policymaking

Summary

Introduction

Unanimously concludes that groups have unequal amounts of power and influence in the political process (Grossmann 2012; Woll 2008; Magee et al 1989). The influence of business groups or corporate actors on governments is undeniable; the news is filled with information regarding the power of these groups and the means they use to influence the government to act in their favor, even if that action is against the public interest. One particular policy domain where the power and influence of business is more evident is trade policy.. The literature has demonstrated that corporate actors, compared with other societal groups, are more successful at lobbying, that is, navigating the politics within the government and its institutions to obtain protection of their interests over that of the public they are supposed to serve (Grossmann 2012; Krueger 1990; Lindblom 1977; Woll 2007). In Brazil, the executive branch is charged with negotiating all theall early of tradeofagreements, the executive branch is charged with negotiating thedetails early details trade and for it is responsible for terms of once the agreement, once Congress and itagreements, is responsible implementing theimplementing terms of the the agreement, Congress approves the treaty.

Results

Discussion

Conclusion