Burma: Loosening up on the Tiger's Tail

Abstract

t the first general meeting of the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP) in 1965, Bogyoke Ne Win addressed the new party cadre on the many obstacles blocking the Burmese Way to Socialism. The military government's goal of transforming Burma into a socialist society was far from realization. Ne Win admitted that the Revolutionary Council continued to experience considerable difficulty in its new role as manager of the state economy. Despite the problems, the military was not yet prepared to relinquish control over the government nor was it willing to expand popular participation in the affairs of state. Characterizing the situation of the Revolutionary Council since it seized state power, Ne Win observed that, It was like having caught hold of the tiger's tail. Once we caught hold of the tiger's tail we could not let go. We had to go ahead to the attack.' On March 2, 1972, the Revolutionary Council marked the tenth anniversary of the coup d'etat which overthrew the government of U Nu and terminated Burma's often turbulent post-Independence experiment in parliamentary democracy.2 As the first decade of the Burmese Way to Socialism ended, the Ne Win government introduced a series of sweeping institutional changes designed to accelerate the revolutionary transformation of Burma and reduce the gap which continued to exist between the military rulers and the Burmese polity. While there is still question as to how substantive some of these changes are in fact, one is nevertheless led to the conclusion that the military is still holding the tiger's tail, but is beginning to loosen its grip.