Buridan and the Definite Description

Abstract

REc~Yr WORK ON JorIN BURIDAN is likely to give the impression that the brilliant 14th-century logician and philosopher was as little concerned with definite descriptions as he was with concepts of identity and 1 Professor Peter Geach has remarked: The lack of a definite article in Medieval Latin means that no 'theory of definite descriptions' may be looked for in medieval writers. 2 Geach's further interpretation of Law, IT]he reference of an expression E must be specifiable in some way that does not involve first determining whether the proposition in which E occurs is true, 3 systematically excludes the factors of identity and existence from the task of establishing a term's reference. Similarly, Professor T. K. Scott emphasizes the principle of identity in analyzing the signification of expressions; but he deemphasizes the element of existence in treating their supposition. He notes: [B]uridan would not blink at admitting the proposition 'there is something which is signified, and it does not exist'. This is but a single example of how little he is bothered by existential commitment. 4 And later, So far from being bothered by the commitments of existential quantification, Buridan insists on the preservation of facts about non-existents as a way of guaranteeing the independence of knowledge from the vagaries of existence. 5 Only Professor Ernest Moody pays heed to the importance of identity and existence for Buridan's ideas on meaning and reference. 6