Burge: Proto-Predicates in Perceptual Representations

Abstract

In this chapter, I discuss Tyler Burge’s account of the origins of objectivity. According to him, perceptual representation has a proto-predicational structure, represents the distal (as opposed to the proximal) stimulus and is necessarily governed by non-biological teleology. Furthermore, Burge argues that there is detailed empirical evidence for this conception of perceptual representation, as a mature scientific discipline, perceptual psychology, uses this conception in mathematically rigorous, predictively successful descriptions of the visual system of animal species. I discuss Burge’s proposal with an eye looking backward and an eye looking forward, as it were. First, the account adds to the critique of Quine’s own mature proposal by suggesting that Quine has been superseded by the progress of science. Second, I consider the merits of Burge’s account as an attempt at naturalized epistemology in its own rights.