Abstract

AbstractWhy do some ethnic nation‐states employ simultaneously inconsistent policies toward ethnic minorities, accommodating them in one sphere but excluding them from another? This article argues that this incoherent treatment of minorities results from the delegation of authority to bureaucrats. Building on the principal‐agent approach and nationalism scholarship, this work develops a causal mechanism explaining the conditions under which bureaucrats can shift state policies toward ethnic minorities and the types of policy preferences they seek to materialize. Defining policy problems, strategically framing optimal solutions, and building support for policy initiatives are the mechanisms through which nonelected officials challenge the existing status quo and seek to shift state policies toward ethnic minorities. This theoretical framework is applied to education and land policies in Israel vis‐à‐vis the Palestinian Arab citizens to illustrate how entrepreneurial bureaucrats can bring about diverse policy outcomes toward the same minority.Related ArticlesBen‐Bassat, Avi, and Momi Dahan. 2018. “Biased Policy and Political Behavior: The Case of Uneven Removal of Elected Mayors in Israel.” Politics & Policy 46(6): 912–50. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12280.Harel‐Shalev, Ayelet. 2009. “Lingual and Educational Policy toward ‘Homeland Minorities’ in Deeply Divided Societies: India and Israel as Case Studies.” Politics & Policy 37(5): 951–70. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2009.00206.x.Tusalem, Rollin F. 2015. “Ethnic Minority Governments, Democracy, and Human Rights.” Politics & Policy 43(4): 502–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12125.

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