Building cybersecurity resilience: integrating defense and recovery investment strategies in an expected resilience framework

Abstract

PurposeTo remain competitive in an unpredictable environment where the complexity and frequency of cybercrime are rapidly increasing, a cyber resiliency strategy is vital for business continuity. However, one of the barriers to improving cyber resilience is that security defense and accident recovery do not combine efficaciously, as embodied by emphasizing cyber security defense strategies, leaving firms ill-prepared to respond to attacks. The present study thus develops an expected resilience framework to assess cyber resilience, analyze cyber security defense and recovery investment strategies and balance security investment allocation strategies.Design/methodology/approachBased on the expected utility theory, this paper presents an expected resilience framework, including an expected investment resilience model and an expected profit resilience model that directly addresses the optimal joint investment decisions between defense and recovery. The effects of linear and nonlinear recovery functions, risk interdependence and cyber insurance on defense and recovery investment are also analyzed.FindingsAccording to the findings, increasing the defense investment coefficient reduces defense and recovery investment while increasing the expected resilience. The nonlinear recovery function requires a smaller defense investment and overall security investment than the linear one, reflecting the former’s advantages in lowering cybersecurity costs. Moreover, risk interdependence has positive externalities for boosting defense and recovery investment, meaning that the expected profit resilience model can reduce free-riding behavior in security investments. Insurance creates moral hazard for firms by lowering defensive investment, yet after purchasing insurance, expanded coverage and cost-effectiveness incentivize firms to increase defense and recovery spending, respectively.Originality/valueThe paper is innovative in its methodology as it offers an expected cyber resilience framework for integrating defense and recovery investment and their effects on security investment allocation, which is crucial for building cybersecurity resilience but receives little attention in cybersecurity economics. It also provides theoretical advances for cyber resilience assessment and optimum investment allocation in other fields, such as cyber-physical systems, power and water infrastructure – moving from a resilience triangle metric to an expected utility theory-based method.