Building, bridging, blocking: the EU’s approach towards sub- regional integration in its broader neighbourhood

Abstract

Introduction: building, bridging and blocking sub-regional integration The number of regional integration processes has exponentially increased since the second half of the twentieth century. Although the scope, objectives and level of integration of these processes vary greatly, this wave of ‘regionalism’ has resulted in a plethora of (sub-)regional organizations, some of which have turned out to be significant international actors like the European Union (EU). This is in line with the evolution from ‘old regionalism’ to ‘new regionalism’ identified by Soderbaum and Sbragia (2010: 571): whereas the former was structured around the Cold War equilibrium and dominated by nation-states, the latter has flourished in the wake of the collapse of the ‘Iron Curtain’, accentuating the economic nature of regionalism and allowing non-state actors to become relevant players as well. Regionalism can be defined as the ‘elaboration of agreed rules and collective institutions by the governments of a region; generally these are formal trade and economic integration agreements but could extend to other areas’ (Holden 2011: 160). Recent literature on the topic has also developed the concept of ‘open regionalism’, which seeks to make the development of regional integration and an active participation in the international markets compatible (Shui and Walkenhorst 2010: 269). As Holden (2011) notes, (sub-)regional integration can take many forms ranging from a pure economic rationale to including political and security issues. Table 9.1 at the end of this chapter provides an overview of the regional integration schemes in the EU’s broader neighbourhood stretching from sub-Saharan Africa to the Middle East and Central Asia. In line with the reasoning by Soderbaum and Sbragia (2010), which attributes more importance to the economic nature of (sub-)regional integration, and taking into account the EU’s own nature as first and foremost a huge single market, this chapter will primarily focus on economic integration processes. As an economic power, the EU has indeed stronger incentives to interact with predominantly economic regionalization. Following Mattli (1999: 41), regional economic integration is understood as theprocess of ‘voluntary linking in the economic domain of two or more formerly independent states to the extent that authority over key areas of domestic regulation and policy is shifted to the supranational level’. This definition can also be applied to the phenomenon of sub-regional integration, with sub-regions being the ‘geographical-political spaces which are subsets of a larger regional space’ (Cottey 2009: 5). In this chapter, the notions of sub-regional and regional integration will be used interchangeably, as there is a difference only in the geographical scope. The process of (sub-)regional economic integration can be divided into several stages, each of which is an enhanced version of the previous one. Following Balassa’s (1961: 2) categorization, a free trade area or agreement (FTA) encompasses the abolition of tariffs and quotas between its members; a customs union adds the harmonization of tariffs vis-a-vis non-members; a common market removes restrictions on the movement of production factors, notably labour and capital; and ultimately an economic union (with a common currency) adds harmonized economic policies and possibly a unified monetary policy as a result of the single currency. The regional integration processes will be examined in light of this progression. This chapter thus examines why and how the EU is engaging with subregional economic integration processes in its broader neighbourhood. To answer this question, a comparative approach will be used in which three different sub-regions of the EU’s broader neighbourhood will be analysed, namely the Southern Mediterranean region, the Gulf and the post-Soviet space.1 Although the Southern Mediterranean is covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), and therefore does not belong to the broader neighbourhood per se, we will focus on this region rather than on sub-Saharan Africa because membership in the current sub-regional integration schemes in the Southern Mediterranean is open to the neighbouring African countries, whereas no other real sub-regional integration scheme has developed in the Sahel or the Horn of Africa. We argue that, contrary to the assumption commonly found in the literature whereby the EU is generally expected to ‘reproduce itself . . . advocating its own form of regional integration’ (Bretherton and Vogler 2006: 95), because it is the ‘best way of managing social and political conflict, fostering the economic wealth of a society and ensuring peace and stability’ (Borzel and Risse 2009: 22), the EU has taken a different stance towards sub-regional integration depending on the region at hand. More precisely, as will be set out below, the EU has adopted a ‘three-B’ approach: a ‘building’ strategy in the Southern Mediterranean, a ‘bridging’ strategy in the Gulf and a ‘blocking’ strategy in the postSoviet space. An analysis of this ‘three-B’ approach towards sub-regional integration that can be observed in the EU’s broader neighbourhood requires an investigation of the EU’s dominant interests in each case. The ‘building’ approach in the Southern Mediterranean region may be understood as a firm support of integration initiatives not only as declared support but also at financial and technicallevels. It is based on the EU’s own integration experience and mainly determined by the regions’ geographical proximity to the EU. This policy is based on the assumption that a greater degree of integration among the countries would boost economic growth and therefore reduce potential problems (immigration, terrorism, political instability, etc.). On the other hand, the ‘bridging’ approach adopted towards the Gulf results in a support of sub-regional integration processes as well, as long as these would serve the EU’s primary foreign policy objectives in the region, namely the securitization of energy resources. Finally, the ‘blocking’ approach used by the EU vis-a-vis the post-Soviet space, and other sub-regional integration schemes which include Russia for that matter, derives from the incompatibility of the EU’s model with the integration model promoted by Russia, the other great governance exporter of the region (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2012: 9). The EU, then, tries to block any sub-regional integration scheme in the post-Soviet space that is not based on its own model or rules, as it is seen as a potential threat for its economic and political objectives. This attitude is to a large extent linked to the mutual distrust and the talking at cross-purposes that increasingly characterize the EU-Russia relationship (Bachkatov 2012: 324). This chapter first introduces an analytical framework to study the motivations that lead the EU to engage with sub-regional economic integration schemes. Then the framework is applied to one case of economic integration in each of the three regions. The case studies have been selected after an extensive mapping exercise, which is reflected in Table 9.1. This will allow for a comparative analysis between both the evolution of the three processes and the EU’s approaches toward each of them. Finally, conclusions will be drawn concerning the effectiveness of the strategies adopted by the EU in accordance with its interests.