Britain and the EEC: Exit, Voice or Loyalty?

Abstract

Britain's relations with Europe are examined with reference to Hirschman's concepts of Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Exit and voice are not necessarily strict alternatives. Non- exit may occasion passivity not voice. Exit is the end-point of a protest continuum. If voice fails to improve a member's material position he may exit. Cost-benefit calculations deter a member from exit after exercising voice since the cost of exit increases over time. Exit threats increase the effectiveness of voice and expedite organisational remedial action. The effectiveness of voice declines after the threat to exit is issued if the organisation believes the voicer wishes to remain a member, or if the threat ceases to be credible. Britain called a referendum to maintain the credibility of the exit threat. A cost-benefit analysis of the relative effectiveness of voice from within the EEC or from without - rather than loyalty - caused Britain to advocate continued membership.