Abstract
One of the key problems of the doctrine of double effect is to establish a clear and unequivocal distinction between the intended and foresight consequences of the action. Many authors see this problem as irresolvable, which is why they usually resort to two strategies: either they completely reject the doctrine as inapplicable or revise it and provide their own, completely new formulation. This paper points out that both strategies are wrong and that a simple analysis of the intention is sufficient to solve the problem. Bratman?s and Cavanaugh?s analysis of intentions is being discussed and the thesis is defended that they provide a solution to the problem.
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