Abstract
According to the well-known Bradley’s Regress argument, one cannot explain the unity of states of affairs by referring to relations combining objects with properties. This argument has been widely discussed within analytic metaphysics, but has not been recognized as relevant for the philosophy of perception. I argue that the mainstream characterization of visual content is threatened by the Bradley’s Regress, and the most influential metaphysical solutions to the regress argument cannot be applied in the context of visual content. However, I show that a proper solution to Bradley’s Regress can be formulated by taking into consideration features of visual content suggested by empirical research in vision science.
Highlights
IntroductionThe famous Bradley’s Regress argument (original formulation: Bradley 1930 [1893]) against the reality of relations has, within the contemporary analytic philosophy, been reinterpreted as a reasoning showing a problem concerning the unity of states of affairs (e.g., Maurin 2012; McBride 2005; Vallicella 2000)
The famous Bradley’s Regress argument against the reality of relations has, within the contemporary analytic philosophy, been reinterpreted as a reasoning showing a problem concerning the unity of states of affairs (e.g., Maurin 2012; McBride 2005; Vallicella 2000)
This is because if we explain the difference in representational contents associated with representing situations (I) and (II) in terms of objects instantiating properties, a further explanation is needed to show in virtue of what in content (Ia) the instantiation connects A with redness and B with greenness and not as in content (IIa)
Summary
The famous Bradley’s Regress argument (original formulation: Bradley 1930 [1893]) against the reality of relations has, within the contemporary analytic philosophy, been reinterpreted as a reasoning showing a problem concerning the unity of states of affairs (e.g., Maurin 2012; McBride 2005; Vallicella 2000). The above way of characterizing visual content seems to be threatened by Bradley’s Regress, which shows that visual content cannot be successfully described as composed of elements relationally bound into states of affairs. I consider which solution to Bradley’s Regress can be applied in the context of visual content and rescue the dominant view on content from entailing an infinite regress. 4 and 5), I argue that the proper solution to Bradley’s Regress in the context of human vision can be obtained by accepting, as psychological theories suggest, that there are two types of visual content, low-level and high-level content, with contrasting characteristics. I show that in case of low-level content Bradley’s Regress cannot start because at this level identity relations between elements of different visual states are not represented. I argue that such special cases are not threatened by Bradley’s Regress
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