Blockchain enhanced price incentive demand response for building user energy network in sustainable society

Abstract

Diversified entities on the demand side pose a challenge to the credibility and security of the power system. In this study, a blockchain enhanced price incentive demand response (DR) is proposed for demand side management. The building users are as price anticipators, whose energy purchasing is a determinant factor for energy price. All building users can actively immigrate the shiftable electric loads into the valley time and cut down the cuttable thermal loads, as the response to the price scheme. Moreover, the information and energy interactions between building users are formulated as a non-cooperative game, the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) is proved. To avoid privacy leakage, each building user is assigned a pseud digital identity and all transactions are conducted by an anonymous operation. To guarantee the credibility of the optimal energy schedule, data verification is proposed to verify the truth of the data executed by each building user. The data maintained by all building users is transparent, traceable, and tamper-resistant. Finally, the empirical study shows that the proposed blockchain enhanced framework is effective for optimal energy scheduling, credibility, and security of the building user energy network. That is extremely significant for sustainable cities and society.