Blockade: From the Maritime to the Continental

Abstract

British appraisals of blockade during the First World War shifted from projection and naval-centrism, to greater focus on continental sources of supply. This was a result of a pre-war fixation on Britain’s own vulnerability to blockade and shifting intelligence analysis during the war as observers reacted to the blockade in progress. This did not happen only because Germany’s sources of oversea supply had dried up, but because of an increased appreciation for the potential significance of overland supply. Drawing upon a diverse array of government archival sources and personal papers, this article focuses on a series of key episodes and assessments, and will demonstrate the evolution of British blockade appraisals and how British pre-war fears ignored German realities. By 1915, however, British assessment placed more and more emphasis on continental supply – sources which had been barely mentioned in pre-war discussions, but now seemed critical. I re-evaluate some of the existing paradigms surrounding blockade by recasting British grand strategy in terms of naval-centrism transitioning to the continental realities of the First World War. In doing so, I also link disparate elements of British policy, strategy, and operations by showing how they all related to blockade and its assessment.