Black-box constructions of signature schemes in the bounded leakage setting

Abstract

To simplify the certificate management procedures in public key infrastructure, Shamir introduced the concept of identity-based cryptography. However, it suffers from the key escrow problem. To solve the problem, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced the notion of certificateless cryptography (CLC). However, if a cryptosystem is not perfectly implemented, adversaries would be able to obtain part of the system’s secret state via side-channel attacks, and thus break the system. This is not considered in the security model of traditional cryptographic primitives. Leakage-resilient cryptography was proposed to prevent adversaries from doing so. There are fruitful works on leakage-resilient encryption schemes, while there are not many on signature schemes in the leakage setting.In this work, we review the folklore generic constructions of identity-based signature and certificateless signature schemes, and show that if the underlying primitives are leakage-resilient, so are the resulting identity-based signature scheme and certificateless signature scheme. The leakage rate follows the minimum one of the underlying primitives. To demonstrate, we show some instantiations of these generic constructions.