Abstract
The Certificateless Signature (CLS) scheme simplifies the need of certificates in the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI),thus the CLS scheme is vulnerable to key replacement attacks. The schemes proposed by Ming-Wang,Li-Cheng-Sun and Cao-Paterson-Kou were analyzed. It is shown that these schemes are insecure because of an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can forge valid signatures. Then the schemes were improved by binding technology,which satisfied a definition of Rafael-Ricardo's certificateless general mode. Finally,it was shown that the identity-based cryptosystem signature scheme cannot be applied to CLS directly when a CLS scheme is designed.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
