Bio-Logic: Does the Living Realize Operations of Logical and Computational Type?

Abstract

The article provides a critical analysis of the representation of the Living as a subject that implements operations of logical and computational type. It is shown that the foundations for transferring the predicate ‘logical’ to the Living are not only general trend for objectification of logic (its embodiment in physical processes of computing machines) but also explicit informational and teleonomic aspects of its existence, which create the appearance that it calculates the direction and result of its actions, implements behavioural algorithms etc. Cases of genome and brain are considered as the most obvious contenders for organic logico-computational systems. It is shown that, despite some analogies (partially discrete character, ‘program-like’ determinism of functioning, similarity of some bioprocesses with logical connectives and inferences), there are not enough reasons to recognize the presence of the logical in the biological. Two main counterarguments are proposed: 1. Ontological one: these systems belong to the living matter, for which any algorithmization is an inevitable simplification. Life is an autopoietic continuum, where the components are in indissoluble totality. 2. Epismetological one: nevertheless, logic is an attribute of human abstract thinking, and its extrapolation to the living is an implicit return to anthropomorphism. It is concluded that the concept of ‘bio-logic’ is relevant if it is understood as a concretization of reasoning modes that take into account qualitative specifics of the life as its object, and is irrelevant as an explicit hypostasis of logico-computational phenomena as its ontological properties.