Beyond Humanism: Gadamer, Althusser, and the Methodology of the Social Sciences

Abstract

IT HAS BECOME something of a cliche' in the social sciences that we are currently in a state of crisis. Although most social scientists would agree that the positivist (or behaviorist-empiricist) methodology provided a common basis for the social sciences in recent decades, most would also agree that this consensus is a relic of the past. Furthermore, contemporary social and political theorists in particular would most likely share a common assessment of this positivist methodology: that it has been seriously discredited in contemporary methodological and philosophical discussions in the social sciences. Yet despite this general agreement among theorists the majority of practicing social scientists continue to conduct research on the basis of the positivist methodology. This fact is most commonly explained by pointing out that although social and political theorists may agree that positivist social science is untenable, they have not been able to agree on its replacement. The net result of this situation, and the reason for the characterization of the social sciences as in a state of crisis, is that the social sciences are cast adrift without a theoretical anchor.