Between Reality and Secrecy: Israel's Freed of Navigation through the Straits of Tiran, 1956-1967

Abstract

Following Suez War, Israel defined any interference with its freedom of navigation through Straits of Tiran as a casus belli. Despite acceptance by international community, Egypt's opposed position remained intact. Hence, to prevent reoccurrence of war, a complex set of tacit understandings and arrangements was reached between opponents during 1957. Under these circumstances and a veil of secrecy, Egypt acquiesced to passage of Israeli ships in Straits while Israel - uncertain about its legal rights and preferring economic considerations to quibbling over sovereignty - accepted various limitations. After concluding negotiations for Israel's withdrawal from Sinai Peninsula in aftermath of 1956 Suez War, Israel's Foreign Minister Golda Meir publicly declared at UN General Assembly on March 1, 1957 that interference, by armed force, with ships of Israeli flag exercising free and innocent passage in Gulf of Aqaba and through Straits ofTiran would be treated as a casus belli.' Hence, on May 22, 1967, when Egypt's President, Gamal 'Abdul Nasser [Nasir], declared that no circumstances will we allow Israeli flag to pass through Aqaba Gulf, international community - not simply rival parties - realized that war was in offing.2 However, documentation declassified over last few years by Israel and by UN enables us to expose untold story of Israel's maritime activity and status regarding navigation in Straits of Tiran (hereafter: the Straits) during decade that spanned abovecited declarations. Researchers' focus on dramatic events (the 1956 Suez War and 1967 Six Day War) demarcating period, scant documentation on Egyptian side and secrecy surrounding exercise of this freedom on Israeli side have managed to keep this intriguing story, in which economic interests suppressed considerations of national sovereignty and international acceptability, in dark until now. After all, as compared to publicity given to Meir's declaration, Nasser's statement, made ten days later (March 11, 1957), has remained in shadows. In that statement, Nasser announced - despite clear Israeli statement - that he would not permit passage of Israeli ships either through Gulf of Aqaba or Suez Canal.3 As no war had broken out, it is clear that one side had retreated from its formal stance. Documentation found in Israeli and UN archives, together with documents from US State Department and, to a lesser extent, British Foreign Office, enable us to draw a more encompassing picture of those events. Our conclusion: both countries retreated from their respective stances. Through a set of tacit understandings and arrangements concluded between two adversaries, Nasser agreed to passage of Israeli shipping. Israel's unenthusiastic acceptance of these arrangements was, however, product of third-party demands (the US and then-UN secretary-General (UNSG) Dag Hammarskjold) combined with Israel's uncertainty about legal status of its position. In addition, contrary to prevailing images, Israel was deeply concerned over durability of its achievement: acceptance of Israel's position according to which it has a 'right' to free navigation through Straits supported by US and major naval powers. In order to provide a frame of reference for analysis of period under study, we first review terms of Israel's freedom of navigation through Straits prior to 1956 Suez War and during negotiations in its aftermath. ISRAEL AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE STRAITS OF TIRAN, 1948-1957 On January 28, 1950, after occupying islands of Sanafir and Tiran, originally held by Saudi Arabia, Egypt was quick to state that: This occupation is not conceived in a spirit to hinder in whatever way it may be innocent passage across maritime space separating these two Islands from Egyptian Coast of Sinai. …