Between Perception and Action By Bence Nanay

Abstract

What mental states or processes mediate between perception and action? Bence Nanay’s lucid and provocative monograph argues that the most important mediating mental states are pragmatic representations (PRs) – perceptual states representing the properties required to successfully act upon an object. After introducing PRs (Ch. 1), Nanay argues that they are genuine perceptual states and necessary antecedents of most actions (Ch. 2), discusses the kinds of properties that can be attributed by PRs and the objects to which our perceptual systems attribute them (Ch. 3), and argues that construing PRs as necessary antecedents of action both affords a way of naturalizing action theory and dethrones propositional attitude psychology as the default mode of explaining intentional actions (Ch. 4). Chapter 5 considers the attribution of action-relevant properties via mental imagery rather than perception, using the ensuing category of pragmatic mental imagery to ground new explanations of pretence actions and some of the semi-automatic, imperfectly rational, activities often understood via appeal to ‘aliefs’ (Gendler 2008). Chapter 6 introduces the notion of vicarious perception – the perceptual attribution of properties pertaining to the possible actions of another agent – and argues convincingly that a wide range of empirical and theoretical questions about infant and animal understanding of the mental states of others can be productively recast in light of this notion. Taken as a whole, the chapters are intended to provide a new theoretical framework for investigating how sophisticated cognitive abilities such as action-planning, imagination, deliberation and interpersonal understanding could be rooted in sensorimotor capacities that we share with infants and animals. As this summary suggests, Nanay’s short book packs in much for philosophers of mind and action to engage with, and each chapter opens many avenues for further exploration and debate. I restrict myself here to raising, in constructive spirit, some questions about his central claim – that PRs are perceptual states that represent the properties of objects required for particular actions and are necessary antecedents of most actions.