Between Legal Philosophy and Cognitive Science: The Tension Problem

Abstract

AbstractMuch controversy has arisen in recent years about the relation between legal philosophy and cognitive science, with some authors announcing a revolution brought about in law by the advances in the scientific study of cognition. At the same time, pessimistic declarations were made, and the significance of cognitive science for law and legal philosophy was denied. In this paper I argue that representatives of legal philosophy are now facing a “tension problem” which comes as a consequence of the following beliefs: that legal philosophy should be naturalized; that contemporary cognitive science is not a source of knowledge proper, that is, a source of naturalization; and that contemporary cognitive science is the best available source of knowledge about cognitive mechanisms. To illustrate the significance of the problem, a case study is presented that concerns research devoted to abstract concepts and its significance for the issues analyzed by legal philosophers, such as legal concepts and legal cognition. More general remarks about the manner of naturalizing jurisprudence are also presented.