Abstract
This paper discusses the relationships between learning processes based on the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies and their myopic and more naive counterparts. The concept of a monotone game, of which games with strategic complementarities are a subclass, is introduced. Then it is shown that convergence under best reply dynamics and dominance solvability are equivalent for all two-player (and some many-player) games in this class.
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