Abstract
We examine bequest-sharing rules where sibling rivalry creates wasteful competition for intergenerational transfers. We show that equal division of bequests minimizes rent-seeking expenditures by siblings while primogeniture maximizes rent-seeking costs. Our results lend theoretical support to the empirical findings of equal bequests without appeal to complex models of the parent-child relationship.
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