Beneficence and distributive justice in a globalising world

Abstract

This paper argues that distributive justice requires a higher degree of enforceability and responsibility than beneficence and that therefore the current world order gives us strong reasons to recognise a global duty of justice to help the poor satisfy their basic needs. It proceeds in three steps. The first part considers the conceptual distinction between duties of justice and duties of beneficence. The second part examines the role that international institutions might play in activating duties of justice, by focusing on two dichotomies that are often used in order to distinguish between beneficence and justice, namely the imperfection/perfection dichotomy and the non-enforceability/enforceability dichotomy. In this respect, it is argued that perfection and enforceability of duties are necessary but not sufficient conditions for distributive duties to be conceived as duties of distributive justice. Therefore, the third part proposes an additional dichotomy focusing on the distinct moral reasons that underlie duties of beneficence and duties of distributive justice, namely the corrective/causal responsibility dichotomy.