Believing in Perceiving: Known Illusions and the Classical Dual‐Component Theory

Abstract

AbstractAccording to a classic but nowadays discarded philosophical theory, perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and full‐blown propositional beliefs. This classicaldual‐component theoryof experience is often taken to be obsolete. In particular, there seem to be cases in which perceptual experience and belief conflict: cases ofknown illusions, wherein subjects have beliefs contrary to the contents of their experiences. Modern dual‐component theories reject the belief requirement and instead hold that perceptual experience is a complex of nonconceptual sensory states and some other sort of conceptual state. The most popular modern dual‐component theory appeals tosui generispropositional attitudes called ‘perceptual seemings’. This article argues that the classical dual‐component theory has the resources to explain known illusions without giving up the claim that the conceptual components of experience are beliefs. The classical dual‐component view, though often viewed as outdated and implausible, should be regarded as a serious contender in contemporary debates about the nature of perceptual experience.