Right Here, Right Now

Abstract

Abstract Perceptual experiences provide us with a fundamental form of consciousness: In perceptual experience we are conscious of our current environment. But then, what is the nature of perceptual experience, and how could we possibly be conscious of our environment when we perceive it? Some philosophers answer these questions by offering a ‘Direct Realist’ account, others argue that we should accept a ‘Representationalist’ account of perceptual experience. Various arguments for and against both positions have been developed; but relevant arguments seem rather well-balanced, so the debate seems to have reached some sort of stand-off. The present chapter aims to offer a new vantage point from which to consider these issues afresh We reach this new vantage point by considering the observation that perceptual experiences have ‘eudaimonic’ value, that is, value with respect to a subject’s well-being. More specifically, I argue that in being in perceptual contact with a mind-independent world, the perceiving subject finds herself open to the world, and I show that and why this openness to the world contributes to the subject’s well-being. This insight seems important in its own right. But we also find that a Direct Realist can account much better for the eudaimonic value of perceptual experience than a Representationalist, which might in turn help with choosing between Representationalism and Direct Realism: As any account of perceptual experience has to account for the fact that perceptual experience has eudaimonic value, we have good reason to choose a Direct Realist account of perceptual experience over a Representationalist one.