Abstract
After having discussed the evidence on decision rules in the former chapter, this chapter focuses on the beliefs individuals have about other players’ behavior in experimental (public good) games, and the potential development of these beliefs in the course of the game. One main objective is to find out whether players’ expectations in public good games are history-dependent, and if so, whether this history-dependence is in accordance with belief learning models. Another objective is to provide a complete model taking account of the interaction and the decision rule simultaneously and to confront such a model with the experimental data. Simulations will be used to see to what extent this model can describe the general patterns in the data.
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