Abstract
The public good game has been widely tested in experiments showing that subjects contribute to public projects more than self-interest economic models predict. To explain these results, a number of different variables – such as environment and design factors (e.g. repetition of the game, communication, decision rule) – should be considered since they differently affect the choice to cooperate. However, public good game has been hardly applied to the domain of group decision-making. In this chapter, we examine the effect of a group decision-making context on a one-shot experiment on achieving cooperation. Specifically, the contribution to the public good provision is examined using a cross-country approach. We consider the availability to cooperate in two different domains, which are immigration and economy, to provide insight in how key mechanisms of the European political system are explained by the patterns of decision adopted by citizens in a multilevel governance system.
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