Abstract
Abstract Interest in de re belief during this half-century was kindled by W. V. Quine, who focused inquiry on the problem of quantification into belief contexts.1 In some respects this focus was unfortunate, in that the difficulties, real and imagined, that arose in interpreting quantification tended to suggest that de re belief needs to be explained in terms of what came to seem the clearer and more basic notion—de dicto belief. The imposition of the methods of modal logic on belief sentences abetted the suggestion by embroiling them in disputes over transworld identity. In fact, de re belief is in important ways more fundamental than the de dicto variety; and this can be seen if one attends to its role in basic cognitive activities.
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