Abstract
Few would deny that folk psychology embodies some essential components of our view of ourselves as persons. The specific element of personhood that interests me is moral agency, the feature that grounds judgments of moral responsibility. An agent is morally responsible for a state of affairs only if he is the sort of being who can generally direct his behavior towards (and away from) states of affairs. Thus, we need a psychological theory that permits effort directed to an end or action guided by an intention. This would certainly not be possible unless human beings have beliefs and behavior is a function of belief.
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