Behavioural choice of governments, enterprises and consumers on recyclable green logistics packaging

Abstract

The logistics packaging are causing increasingly serious environmental pollution, the future development of recyclable green logistics packaging (RGLP) is attracting widespread attention. The implementation of RGLP requires the joint efforts of governments, logistics enterprises and consumers. To identify the optimal strategy for RGLP, this paper studies the behavioural choice of governments, logistics enterprises and consumers. First, a three-party evolutionary game model is constructed among governments, logistics enterprises and consumers. Second, evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) are discussed. Finally, a numerical simulation of the model is conducted to analyze the impact of some key parameters on the behaviour of governments, logistics enterprises and consumers. The results show that when government subsidies increase, logistics enterprises will develop and implement RGLP faster. When the rewards of logistics enterprises’ increase, consumers will respond to corporate rewards to different degrees according to the level of environmental awareness. When environmental awareness is low, enterprise rewards will make consumers choose to use RGLP significantly faster. When the cycle times of RGLP increase, the effect on logistics enterprises will be reduced because of the upper limit of the parameters. The results provide a theoretical basis for the implementation of RGLP, which is helpful for governments and logistics enterprises to make more scientific and reasonable decisions.