Beating the Rival but Losing the Game: How Rivalry Shifts Negotiator Goals Away from Value Claiming

Abstract

Decades of negotiations research has revealed the importance of BATNA – best alternatives to negotiated agreement. Negotiators with stronger BATNAs tend to have greater power and claim higher values in negotiation. In addition to the value of the BATNA, the current work suggests that how the identity of negotiators’ BATNAs – that is, who they have an alternative offer from – can affect negotiation strategies. Specifically, we apply a relational lens to the BATNA dynamics and examine how negotiators respond to a counterpart that has an alternative offer from their rival. The three experimental studies show that the alternative offer from a rival activates a goal of defeating the rival and leads negotiators to make a more favorable offer to their counterparts. The effect of rivalry on the favorability of offers was partially driven by the increase in motivation to defeat the rival, which further shields the usual goal in negotiation of getting a good deal. Our model and results show that competing against a rival drives negotiators to set a less aspirational goal, which may adversely impact their decision-making.