Be Like This. Norms, Examples, Documents and Indexicals from a Neo-Aristotelian Perspective

Abstract

I propose an account of exemplarity based on the (neo-Aristotelian) ontological distinction between individuals and properties, and on the corresponding semantic distinction between singular terms, which single out individuals, and predicates, which designate properties. I shall focus on indexicals as paradigmatic singular terms. For instance, “this man” is an indexical, whereas “man” or “red” are predicates. I shall define an example as an individual used as a constituent of a predicate, as when one says “The color of my car is like this” pointing at a particular sample. An example, so understood, is a sort of virtual finger or wand, which turns an individual singled out by an indexical (“this”) into a predicate (“like this”). I shall develop this conception of exemplarity in order to account for the normative force of examples. First, I shall characterize a normative claim as a sentence that connects a subject to a predicate through a deontic verb (should, ought, must, can, may etc.). Then, I shall call “normative exemplarity” the case in which the predicate of a normative claim is an example, as when one says “You should behave like this man” pointing at Socrates. Finally, I shall argue that some norms can be enforced within a certain community through normative exemplarity, provided that the relevant features of the exemplar individual (that to whom the indexical refers in the expression “like this”) remain accessible to the members of the community. I shall show that if the exemplar individual does not exist anymore, the community can still keep such norms in force by relying on documents that allow the community's members to steadily preserve the relevant features of that individual. Ultimately, understanding such processes of generation and preservation of examples can contribute to explain how normative systems emerge from the historical content of the times.