Abstract
Due to openness and lack of authentication, like other members of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Club, BeiDou-II civilian navigation signals are vulnerable to all kinds of spoofing attacks. As a result, both the positioning and timing functions of BeiDou-II civil satellite navigation are likely to be controlled by the spoofer. In this paper, an anti-spoofing scheme of BeiDou-II Navigation Message Authentication & Spread Spectrum Information (BD-II NMA&SSI) is proposed by using SM cryptographic algorithms and spread spectrum information to resist spoofing attacks. The SM cryptographic algorithms are used for generating authentication information to detect spoofing attacks. The spread spectrum information is to protect the authentication information in the D2 navigation messages from modification. Experimental results show that the scheme guarantees the authenticity of BD-II satellite navigation messages, meets the requirement of anti-spoofing and takes a rather less effect on the satellite navigation system.
Highlights
Satellite navigation has been widely used in various fields of the world
Combining the advantages of Navigation Message Authentication (NMA) scheme and Spreading Code Authentication (SCA) scheme, we propose an anti-spoofing scheme called BD-II-NMA&SSI based on navigation message authentication and spread spectrum information protection
Based on the analysis of the spoofing attack, this paper proposed an anti-spoofing method of BD-II-NMA&SSI based on the D2 satellite navigation message
Summary
Satellite navigation has been widely used in various fields of the world. From the perspective of civil navigation signal application, satellite navigation has been deployed in industries such as air traffic management (ATM) and marine transportation as an infrastructure [1]. Many scholars have applied signal-based anti-spoofing methods to satellite navigation systems. Humphrey [8] had developed a method based on received power estimation Their method can distinguish the normal satellite signal from the multipath-affected signal, spoofing signal and jamming signal. They detected spoofing signals by observing an abnormally shaped or asymmetric correlation peaks They calculated appropriate interference detection thresholds based on these metrics. According to the simulation result, when the receiver was dynamic and suffering the spoofing attack, the doppler frequency shift was abnormal. Based on this feature, the receiver can detect spoofing attacks in time.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
