Battleships, D-Day, and naval strategy

Tim Benbow

doi:10.1177/09683445211022765

Abstract

This article explores the role of the battleship in naval strategy, challenging the contention that they were obsolete before the end of World War II, using the D-Day landings of June 1944 as its focus. It argues that battleships played two indispensable roles. First, they countered the threat from enemy capital ships, both to achieve command of the sea and to protect the invasion fleet. Second, they provided fire support both for the initial assault and also thereafter in defending the bridgehead and assisting the Allied advance, thereby contributing to the collapse of the German strategy for defence.

Highlights

This article explores the role of the battleship in naval strategy, challenging the contention that they were obsolete before the end of World War II, using the D-Day landings of June 1944 as its focus
The battleship was dominant in navies and naval strategy at the beginning of the twentieth century and entirely absent from both by its end
This article explores the role of the battleship by analysing its contribution to one of the pivotal operations of the war – Operation Neptune, the D-Day landings that began on 6 June 1944 as the first phase of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of Western Europe

Summary

Countering enemy heavy warships

The classic core role of battleships was to counter enemy heavy warships and thereby establish the conditions necessary for the rest of the fleet to carry out its own tasks. The Norwegian destroyer Svenner, sunk off Sword Beach by torpedo boats, was the only Allied vessel lost to German warships on D-Day.[10] Given the limited threat from enemy surface forces and the number of cruisers and destroyers present, as well as air support from shore bases, there was little call for battleships in this role. They would have become more central, had a greater threat emerged – the possibility of which was envisaged and anticipated. His force estimate, rested on the comfort of hindsight; as far as the planners knew, all the units listed above were potentially available

13. NJC1004

Naval bombardment: the plan

Naval fire support after the initial assault

Conclusion