The pen behind the fleet: The influence of sir Julian Stafford Corbett on British naval development, 1898–1918

Abstract

Julian Corbett, a lesser known naval strategist compared to his American contemporary Alfred Thayer Mahan, provided pre‐World War I Britain with invaluable lessons in naval strategy and in strategic thought through his writings and lectures. Unlike Mahan, however, Corbett's works on the interdependence of the military services in future conflicts, and the need to understand the limitations of maritime power, remain relevant in the 1990s. What is astounding is that Corbett's warnings against perceiving naval strategy as a series of “Trafalgars” occurred during his tenure at the Royal Navy War College, in an era when Britain unreservedly ruled the waves. Corbett's conclusions attracted considerable attention, in particular from Lord John Fisher, first sea lord of the Admiralty, and Admiral Edmond Slade, chair of the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defense, and later, director of naval intelligence during World War I. Corbett's close relationship with these men permitted him to put his writings into practice. Respect for the authority with which Corbett advanced his views was recognized with his posting as the official historian for the war. Corbett's writings and lectures on naval strategy were cut short by a fatal heart attack in 1921.