Bases for a New Approach

Abstract

Abstract We have seen that in the context of a maximizing conception of practical rationality the recognition that positive freedom is a non-moral good leads the negative liberal fatally into the field of positive liberalism. This aspect of negative liberalism not only deprives it of its identity in the face of positive liberalism but disqualifies it from justifying pre-eminent negative rights, at least in the natural and straightforward shape that I expounded at the commencement of the previous chapter. One possible way of saving negative liberalism would be to present an argument purporting to prove that positive freedom is not a value on the same footing as negative freedom. But, since negative and positive freedom do not appear to be significantly distinguishable and negative freedom may even be considered a part of positive freedom, it seems inevitable to think that, if negative freedom and positive freedom are valuable, they are of similar importance. Once one is embarked on the task of justifying libertarianism on the basis of a distinctively liberal value, it seems to me futile to go on insisting that negative freedom, but not positive freedom, is valuable, or that positive freedom is less important than negative freedom.