Berlin's Two Concepts of Liberty: A Reassessment and Revision

Abstract

In distinguishing between negative and positive freedom, Isaiah Berlin expressed a preference for negative freedom. Given the track record of those who in the past have advocated positive freedom, this is not surprising. But advocates of positive freedom do not accept that tyranny necessarily results from embracing their conception of freedom, and they are convinced that a commitment to negative freedom is never enough to defend “freedom” against tyrants. They do, however, share one thing in common with those who favor negative freedom: both equate their conception of freedom with “true freedom,” and treat the other as either false or incomplete. This might suggest that Berlin's distinction is more a partisan's tool than a tool of analysis. I disagree. But rather than reducing it to a distinction between “freedom from” and “freedom to,” we need to expand it. Not only will this enable us to move beyond an important criticism of Berlin's conception of freedom, it will also provide a better explanation for why negative freedom is as likely as positive freedom to diminish “true freedom” and why positive freedom is as likely as negative freedom to increase it.