Abstract
We study the effect of bank shareholding on corporate cash management in China. We document that for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with some of their shares owned by banks, the market value of cash holdings is less, and the overinvestment of free cash flow is more than those SOEs without bank shareholding. For non-SOEs, we do not find such an adverse impact. We also find that the adverse impact of bank shareholding is confined to state-owned banks owning SOE shares and stronger for pyramidal structure than those of non-pyramidal structure SOEs. The Chinese environment offers lessons that can help other emerging markets to review their bank shareholding regulations.
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