Back to the Future with Asymmetric Warfare

Abstract

The term du jour for future military operations is asymmetric warfare; ironically, it's a concept as old as warfare itself. For centuries, even millennia, weaker opponents have sought to neutralize their enemy's technological or numerical superiority by fighting in ways or on battlefields that nullify it. is the human dimension of man's oldest profession, and the latest example of this anything-but-recent phenomenon is the Russian debacle in Chechnya. When the Chechens decided to use military means to achieve their independence, they did not hesitate for an instant to make their very own capital city the battleground. Once forced to abandon Grozny, these hard-nosed fighters focused their efforts on other towns and villages in the region, some outside their own borders. Russian failures in Grozny and other less well-known urban battles over the past five years attest to the effectiveness of this particular strategy--effective, but not new. The take-away from the fighting in the northern Caucasus is tha t it is the skill of soldiers of all ranks, not the peculiar nature of the terrain they are operating on, that decides the outcome of military operations. City streets do not win or lose battles. might be instructive to step back in time two thousand years to examine another instance where a tribal society refused to be intimidated by a modern army, chose their battlefield wisely, capitalized on some bad operational decisions, and brought a superpower's army to its knees. The similarities between events separated by so much time are extraordinary and boil down to a variation on an age-old theme: God might usually favor the side with the heaviest battalions, but always the smartest. The difference between the Roman experience in 1st-century Germania and the Russian experience in the North Caucasus is that the Roman army learned the lesson. The jury is out as to whether the same can be said for Russian, or, for that matter, US military forces. Eschewing the urban or any other complex battlefield is simply not the answer. Learning how to fight smart in it is. is a matter of strategic necessity because, like it or not, It doesn't do you any good to make the grand strategy of the Roman Empire if yo ur legions can't fight, and we can't fight. [1] The statement requires further examination. Lessons from the Distant Past... In 9 A.D., the Roman legate Publius Quinctilius Varus led his XVII, XVIII, and XIX Legions into modern north Germany between the Rhine and Elbe rivers on what we would today call a peace enforcement mission. His opposite number was Arminius, a Germanic chieftain who had served in the Roman army as commander of auxiliary forces and was, therefore, a Roman citizen. We can surmise that Arminius fully understood the Roman army's operational strengths and weaknesses. He was surely familiar with the weapons and tactics of this technologically superior force and must also have known that Varus had at his disposal three legions of infantry, three troops of equitati (cavalry), and six cohorts of auxiliaries. [2] As the underdog must, Arminius sought an innovative means to defeat this impressive force. His success graphically underscores the human dimension of warfare. Not satisfied with his already well-developed knowledge of the enemy, the Germanic chieftain took the time and effort to further enhance his situational awareness by frequently dining in Varus's officers' mess. He went to great lengths to flatter the corrupt Roman legate and convince him that he and his tribe, the Cherusci, were friends and allies of Rome. [3] All the while, he was adroitly shaping his future battlefield. For his part, Varus was an easy mark. More interested in plundering the region for personal gain than protecting it, he quickly fell into the self-delusional trap that the Cherusci were friendly and that military preparedness to fight in this heavily wooded and hilly terrain was not a requirement. …