B2C or O2O? The strategic implications for the fresh produce supply chain based on blockchain technology

Abstract

The breakout of COVID-19 has made consumers pay attention to the quality and source of fresh produce sold on e-commerce platforms, while the information traceability feature of blockchain can effectively monitor fresh produce quality and cope with fresh produce safety issues. Considering influencing factors such as the cost of blockchain technology, and the perceived and real quality of fresh produce, should blockchain technology be adopted in the supply chains for fresh produce? In this paper, for a fresh produce supply chain consisting of an e-commerce platform, i.e., Business-to-Consumer (B2C) or Online-to-Offline (O2O), and an offline retailer, we apply the Stackelberg game model to investigate the equilibrium strategy of the supply chain under the following scenarios: Model C(O) where the B2C (O2O) supply chain without blockchain technology; and Model CB(OB) where the B2C (O2O) supply chain implements blockchain technology. We research the conditions for implementing blockchain technology in the B2C (O2O) supply chain, the best business model for the e-commerce platform, and the conditions for the offline retailer to cooperate with the O2O e-commerce platform. Further, we investigate the impact of consumers’ awareness of traceability and the incentive effect of government subsidy on the implementation of blockchain technology. It is shown that the B2C (O2O) supply chain implements blockchain technology only when consumers' awareness of traceability is high. At this time, the offline retailer has the willingness to cooperate with the e-commerce platform. For the B2C supply chain, government subsidies are beneficial to the B2C e-commerce platforms but not to the offline retailer. For the O2O supply chain, government subsidies are beneficial to both the O2O e-commerce platform and the offline retailer.