Abstract

132 Max Weber Studies© Max Weber Studies 2016. According to Scaff, Weber’s heritage consists of four modes of analysis: structural, cultural, and institutional analysis, and the employment of rational actor models. The structural dimension refers to the social structure, or socioeconomic and sociotechnical environment, that determines the life chances of status groups and classes. The cultural dimension points to the meaning of phenomena and their relevance for people’s conduct of life. The institutional dimension underlines the rules and regulations that determine the constraints for action. It is a pity that Scaff cites Douglas North but not M. Rainer Lepsius, who not only presented Weber as an institutional thinker but also contributed masterpieces of institutional analyses in a Weberian spirit. Finally, the models of rational action permit alternative courses of behavior to be gauged in terms of their ‘irrationality,’ i.e., as a deviation from an ideal-typically constructed mode of optimal action. Max Weber was and is certainly more than a mainstream sociologist . For Karl Jaspers, he was the philosopher and the ‘macroanthropos of our world’. Weber is not only embedded in the canon of Western thinkers. He also makes us question what the turbulent social change around us means for the life conduct of modern human beings—an aspect of Weber’s legacy that has been emphasized by Wilhelm Hennis as well as Scaff. This ‘social-philosophical’ side of Weber explains his attractiveness for critical theory, psychoanalysis, as well as late Foucauldianism, and remains today one of the most interesting avenues for future research in the social sciences. Lawrence Scaff makes a strong case for ‘Weber and the Weberians ’ as a centerpiece of sociology today. He has not only become a ‘magister ludi’ of Weberianism but is also well versed in the trends and tendencies, discourses and discussions in the social sciences of the twentieth century. This elegantly crafted and brilliant book is a must-read and the guide for Weber in the twenty-first century. Hans-Peter Müller Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin Sven Eliaeson, Patricia Mindus, and Stephen P. Turner, eds., Axel Hägerström and Modern Social Thought (Oxford: Bardwell Press, 2014), ix + 461pp. (hbk). ISBN 978-1-905622-43-6. £150.00. Axel Hägerström (1868–1939) is probably the greatest Swedish philosopher , keeping up with leading international standards, although Book Reviews 133© Max Weber Studies 2016. much more known in Sweden than abroad. He was influenced by Kant and Neo-Kantianism as well as Nietzsche, and paid attention to Marx, the German social democrat Eduard Bernstein, and the Austro-Marxist Victor Adler, but has become much more known as the founder of analytical philosophy in Sweden. He was one of many in the movement of cultural radicalism during the decades around 1900. His credo was the rejection of the belief in the objective existence of values. In his contribution to meta-ethics and philosophy of law he claimed that moral judgements cannot be true. A frustrated academic opponent labelled him in the early 1930s a value nihilist, and this label became the accepted reference among both adherents and antagonists. In his legal-philosophical project he denied the existence of natural or objective law. The laws were expressions of power and material interests and changed with them. He contrasted the actually existing positive laws with the imagery of natural laws, which he argued were nothing but a construct reflecting social power relationships. Class interests determined the sense of justice. With his interest in values and the question of objectivity he quite obviously touched upon problems raised not only by Karl Marx but also by Max Weber. Hägerström’s rejection of objective morals and morality invited social protests against laws and norms. Moral indignation over experienced injustice was not based on thoughts about objective values, and it could generate political power which, in turn, would carry through into legislation and reforms. Although there were obvious points in common with Marx, there was a decisive difference on this point. Hägerström rejected Marx’s conception of a kind of intrinsically objective developmental logic and criticized Marxism for its teleology. The philosophy of Hägerström fits hand in glove with...

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