Abstract
In this paper, we argue that solutions to normative challenges associated with autonomous driving, such as real-world trolley cases or distributions of risk in mundane driving situations, face the problem of reasonable pluralism: Reasonable pluralism refers to the fact that there exists a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive moral doctrines (religions, philosophies, worldviews) within liberal democracies. The corresponding problem is that a politically acceptable solution cannot refer to only one of these comprehensive doctrines. Yet a politically adequate solution to the normative challenges of autonomous driving need not come at the expense of an ethical solution, if it is based on moral beliefs that are (1) shared in an overlapping consensus and (2) systematized through public reason. Therefore, we argue that a Rawlsian justificatory framework is able to adequately address the normative challenges of autonomous driving and elaborate on how such a framework might be employed for this purpose.
Highlights
Autonomous driving (AD) is an emerging technology that enables all of the dynamic driving tasks involved in operating a vehicle to be managed by its network- and sensor-supported computer system so that no human passenger is required to monitor the traffic.1 This technology, if it comes to full fruition, promises immense advantages over our present transportation systems in which vehicles are still operated by human drivers — advantages such as increased road safety, comfort, and access to personal mobility for previously excluded groups
In this paper, we argue that solutions to normative challenges associated with autonomous driving, such as real-world trolley cases or distributions of risk in mundane driving situations, face the problem of reasonable pluralism: Reasonable pluralism refers to the fact that there exists a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive moral doctrines within liberal democracies
We have shown that the problem of reasonable pluralism is important for the debate on AD challenges and that against this background a Rawlsian justificatory framework deserves due attention
Summary
Autonomous driving (AD) is an emerging technology that enables all of the dynamic driving tasks involved in operating a vehicle to be managed by its network- and sensor-supported computer system so that no human passenger is required to monitor the traffic. This technology, if it (ever) comes to full fruition, promises immense advantages over our present transportation systems in which vehicles are still (mostly) operated by human drivers — advantages such as increased road safety, comfort, and access to personal mobility for previously excluded groups (e.g., the elderly, children, or people with impairments). In Rawlsian terms: solutions to AD challenges must be justified within the scope of public reason by showing that they are part of the set of considered judgements that form a full reflective equilibrium based on an overlapping consensus of a specific liberal society We contend that this means the justification for the solution to AD challenges has been shown to be appealing and acceptable to every reasonable citizen. If there is an agreement in liberal societies that in an important political sense being free means being politically autonomous and that human dignity demands this kind of freedom (without presupposing a specific metaphysical explanation of why this is the case), this would make a strong rationale for the public reason approach These two arguments certainly might not convince someone who has given serious thought to the matter and supports a different approach to political legitimacy. If one can agree with this modest claim, our further findings are relevant
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