Australia´s Peacekeeping Role in the Post‑Cold War Era

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Introduction In the post-COLD WAR era, has become an important feature of international politics. This is set out under Chapter VII of the United Nations (UN) Charter, which states that intervening forces are authorized to use all necessary means to achieve the objectives of peace and security in a particular situation. During the Cold War, peacekeeping had mostly been based on Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Peacekeeping forces played a role in implementing agreements between parties that had previously been in conflict. With variations depending on specific circumstances, expanded peacekeeping has been the basis for interventions in northern Iraq in support of the Kurds (1991), Bosnia (1992-95), Somalia (1992-95), Haiti (1994-97), Rwanda (1994-96), East Timor (1999-2002), and Sierra Leone (since 1999). The United Nations Security Council authorized intervention but the UN would not necessarily organize the intervening force. There was sometimes resort to coalitions of the willing to provide the necessary forces for expanded peacekeeping. The Kosovo intervention of 1999 was not specifically authorized by the UN Security Council, but was conducted under the auspices of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Against the background of these changes occurring in relation to peacekeeping at the global level, we can ask what position Australian governments have taken on this issue. Australia has played a significant role in relation to a number of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era. What has been the political rationale for Australian involvement? What political influences, domestic and international, have shaped the policies of Australian governments? In practice, what have been the main motivations for the various Australian peacekeeping operations? What political impact have Australian interventions had compared with the initial rationales? While recent assessments of Australia's peacekeeping role have rightly focused on the East Timor intervention, this article reviews the whole post-Cold War era. It deals primarily with the broader political context rather than giving attention to the many operational issues that have been of particular concern to Australian defence planners. The argument presented is that Australian involvement in peacekeeping has been primarily the outcome of perceptions of national interest held by key decision-makers. However, those perceptions have been tempered by moral considerations. This was more explicitly the case under the Labor government before 1996, but has not been absent under the conservative Coalition government since 1996. Beginning under Labor, and becoming even more pronounced under the Coalition, there was a trend towards concentrating Australian peacekeeping efforts in its immediate region. Apart from a public perception that Australia should be contributing to the resolution of major international huma nitarian crises, the most significant influences on Australian policy emanate from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Department of Defence. Within this context, the relevant ministers usually also have a strong impact. If a major crisis with peacekeeping implications arises then a wider range of ministers will be involved, and public pressure can also be a major factor. At the international level, the relationship with allies, particularly the United States, and regional states can be an influence. The United States has an expectation that Australia will play a leading role in dealing with issues in maritime Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands. At the same time, Australia wishes to proceed in such a way that it maintains co-operative relationships, as much as possible, with the governments in those regions. The United Nations itself frequently looks to Australia as a reliable contributor when a peacekeeping operation is being mounted. …