Australian Military Operations in Vietnam, and: The Western Desert Campaign 1940-41 (review)

Abstract

Reviewed by: Australian Military Operations in Vietnam, and: The Western Desert Campaign 1940-41 Allan Converse Australian Military Operations in Vietnam. Includes CD-Rom. By Albert Palazzo . Canberra, Australia: Army History Unit, 2006. ISBN 1-876439-10-6. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 173. $62.85. The Western Desert Campaign 1940-41. Includes CD-Rom. By Glenn Wahlert . Canberra, Australia: Army History Unit, 2006. ISBN 0-975766-9-2-9. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 96. $56.56. Though regarded with some disdain by professional military men and military historians, the increase in popular war gaming and war modeling is beginning to have some impact on contemporary military history. Many historical guides for war gamers and modelers have appeared in recent years, [End Page 294] and the best of these are also useful to scholars. The Australian Army Campaigns Series, a new offering from the Australian Army History Unit, is aimed simultaneously at the professional military, scholarly, and gaming/modeling audiences. These are serious works, written by leading Australian historians. The two volumes reviewed here differ considerably, not only in focus and approach but in quality as well. Glenn Wahlert is best known for The Other Enemy?, his pioneering (and highly valuable) study of Australian military police work in the world wars. The Western Desert Campaign 1940-41 describes a relatively brief but important campaign, the first British Commonwealth offensive against the Italians in North Africa, concentrating on the role of the 6th Australian Division. Wahlert provides few new insights, but his narrative of the campaign is concise, straightforward, well-written, and reliable. He is at his best with the controversial question of discipline in the 6th Division, a subject he knows well. Wahlert goes astray slightly on some other matters, however. He gives excessive praise to Sir Archibald Wavell, the British theatre commander at the time, at the expense of the much more aggressive and energetic Sir Richard O'Connor, GOC of Western Desert Force and the real mastermind of the offensive. Wahlert rightly acknowledges that the many older soldiers in the Second AIF served as examples for the younger men, but he does not point out that older soldiers were much more prone to both physical and mental breakdown under the strain of field service. The illustrations in this book vary in quality. The paintings by Mark Wahlert are the best of the lot. Unfortunately, there are some serious errors in the captions identifying vehicles and aircraft. An image of an A15 Crusader cruiser tank is misidentified as an A13, while a Blenheim Mark IV bomber is incorrectly captioned as a Mark I. Modelers will be quick to spot such errors, and they should be corrected in future printings. Albert Palazzo's book on the Australian army in Vietnam is an altogether superior work. In only 173 pages, Palazzo gives a fine capsule history of the Australian experience in that conflict. He covers every major aspect of the army's work, illustrating general points with detailed accounts of individual actions. This book is more than just a history; it is also a useful learning tool. Palazzo is at his best in the little "lessons" notes scattered through the book. Here, Palazzo illustrates general tactical and operational points by citing specific actions and decisions. While Palazzo pays due tribute to the dedication, bravery, and skill of the Australian forces in Vietnam, his book shows that such qualities are not enough when troops have to operate with an inappropriate doctrine and an incoherent strategy. Australian troops excelled at patrolling and small-unit tactics, but their success in Phuoc Tuy province was only superficial. The Viet Cong soon stopped challenging Australian firepower and simply went to ground, content to exercise silent political control from their bases. Despite repeated attempts, Australian troops never really managed to disrupt those bases for more than brief periods. Australian manpower was never sufficient to do the job, mainly for domestic political reasons. [End Page 295] Palazzo highlights many weaknesses, both large and small, in Australian operations: inadequate cooperation with Americans and South Vietnamese, misdirected civic action programs, excessive command turnover and frequent changes in tactical policy, and failure to appreciate the role of armor...