Auction-based parking mechanisms considering withdrawal behaviors

Abstract

Auction-based parking mechanisms (ABPM) have been recognized as promising solutions to the parking problem. As the operator of the ABPM, the parking platform should not only be well-operated to provide parking services for demanders in need but also maintain commercial viability for sustainable operations. Motivated by this, we propose three ABPMs, namely, the ABPM without withdrawal right, the ABPM with costless withdrawal right, and the ABPM with non-free withdrawal right. Particularly, we characterize the parking demanders' withdrawal behaviors in the ABPMs. This behavior is motivated by the demanders' negative utilities derived from the auction sequence, where the demanders will first submit bid prices and are then allowed to withdraw from the parking market after the announcement of auction results when they are aware of their true valuations. We derive the equilibrium bidding strategies and the platform's expected revenues under the above three mechanisms and compare them in terms of the analytical results. It has been found that the introduction of withdrawal right will stimulate demanders to raise their bids for winning and the ABPM with non-free withdrawal right generates the highest revenue under certain conditions. A case study of parking in Beijing Financial Street has been conducted to illustrate the findings and explore managerial implications, including adapting the ABPM with non-free withdrawal right, narrowing the parking supply-demand gap, and enhancing travel experiences on the way to parking.