Abstract
A parking market with both public parking and shared parking is considered in this paper, where multiple players, i.e., the public parking platform, the shared parking platform, parkers, and parking owners, are incorporated. To investigate the impact of mutual attractions between demands and supplies, i.e., network externalities, on the two parking platform competition, we propose a market equilibrium model considering three competition scenarios. Results show that network externalities negatively affect the parking platforms' profits in certain cases. Measures to mitigate the negative impact of network externalities are further proposed for sustainable development.
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